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Developing Scots Criminal Law: A Shift in Responsibility? 
 
James Chalmers* 
 
In 2002, when a group of academics were close to completing an unofficial draft criminal code for 
Scotland,1 one commentator remarked that the project sought “to follow the path marked out by 
other Anglo-American codification initiatives in respect of its political ends: wresting the control over 
law-making from the judiciary”.2 
 
That observation was significant at the time, and more so in retrospect. It might be thought odd that 
the legislature or government would not naturally be identified as the body in control, but the reality 
was that the Scottish Executive (as it then was) had demonstrated little interest in substantive 
criminal law, being willing to leave reform to the courts.3 Around that time, the High Court had 
certainly been willing to reshape the law, and radically so. In Drury v HM Advocate,4 the court sought 
to clarify the law of provocation by redefining the definition of murder in a fashion which it was 
widely accepted ran risks of legal changes not anticipated by the court.5 In Galbraith v HM Advocate 
(No. 2),6 it recast the partial defence of diminished responsibility, offering a definition notionally 
grounded in the older Scottish authorities but in fact bearing a striking similarilty to the statutory 
form of the defence found in English law.7 In Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001),8 it rewrote 
the law of rape, holding that the offence was based on the absence of consent on the part of the 
complainer, rather than the use or threat of force on the part of the accused – the sort of 
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1 Subsequently published by the Scottish Law Commission in 2003, and submitted to the Minister for Justice in 
July of that year: E Clive, P Ferguson, C Gane and A McCall Smith, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with 
Commentary (2003). 
2 L. Farmer, “Enigma: Decoding the Draft Criminal Code” (2002) 7 S.L.P.Q. 68 at 79-80. 
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5 See F. Leverick, “Mistake in Self-Defence After Drury” 2002 J.R. 35; M.G.A. Christie, “The Coherence of Scots 
Criminal Law: Some Aspects of Drury v. H.M. Advocate” 2002 J.R. 273. 
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7 J. Chalmers, “Abnormality and Anglicisation” (2002) 6 Edin. L.R. 108. 
8 2002 S.L.T. 466. 
fundamental redefinition of a serious offence that might occupy law reform bodies for years in 
another jurisdiction. In Webster v Dominick,9 it abolished the offence of “shameless indecency”, 
substituting a new crime of “public indecency” in its place. 
 
These decisions were not some exceptional flurry of activity, but the continuation of a well-
established pattern of judicial law reform.10 Gradually, however, something seems to have changed. 
The power of the Lord Advocate to seek an authoritative determination from the High Court of a 
point of law which has arisen in a trial,11 which led to the law of rape being rewritten, has not been 
exercised for over a decade.12 In Petto v HM Advocate,13 faced with a tricky question as to the scope 
of the law of murder, the High Court largely sidestepped the question, while eschewing any 
suggestion that all was well in the state of the law:14 
 
“In Scotland we have a definitional structure in which the mental element in homicide is 
defined with the use of terms such as wicked, evil, felonious, depraved and so on, which may 
impede rather than conduce to analytical accuracy. In recent years, the authors of the draft 
Criminal Code for Scotland have greatly assisted our thinking on the matter; but we remain 
burdened by legal principles that were shaped largely in the days of the death penalty, that 
are inconsistent and confused and are not yet wholly free of doctrines of constructive 
malice. My own view is that a comprehensive re-examination of the mental element in 
homicide is long overdue. That is not the sort of exercise that should be done by ad 
hoc decisions of this court in fact-specific appeals. It is pre-eminently an exercise to be 
carried out by the normal processes of law reform.” 
 
It seems unlikely that a High Court judge might now argue that the court should actively develop the 
law so as to ensure that it is not “subject to undue influence by overenthusiastic legislators”.15 
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So what might explain the court’s seemingly increased caution? Part of the answer is that the 
Scottish Parliament has found its voice in criminal law. Although the Parliament was active in 
reforming criminal procedure from its inception,16 enthusiasm for criminal law reform was absent. It 
was notable that, following the controversial trial decision which led the the law of rape being 
rewritten in Lord Advocate’s Reference (No 1 of 2001), the immediate response was for the Lord 
Advocate to announce a reference to the High Court for the law to be reconsidered, rather than 
there being any suggestion of law reform via a body such as the Scottish Law Commission. 
 
Gerry Maher’s appointment to the Commission in 2000, however, gave that body the opportunity to 
develop a body of work in criminal law which had previously been absent.17 Subsequently, when it 
became clear that the law of sexual offences remained particularly problematic despite the 2001 
Reference decision, the Scottish Ministers referred the subject to the Commission, ultimately 
resulting in the Sexual Offences (Scotland) Act 2009.18 (Referrals to the Commission were to prove 
an attractive option for the Government in responding to criminal justice controversies once again in 
2007, with the acquittal of Angus Sinclair resulting in three different topics being referred to the 
Commission for review.19)  
 
While the 2009 Act remains by some distance the Parliament’s most significant innovation in 
criminal law to date, a more cautious approach by the courts has been accompanied by a greater 
willingness on the part of Parliament to intervene in the area. So, for example, after the High Court 
decided in Harris v HM Advocate (No. 1)20 that the offence of breach of the peace required a “public 
element”, it was not long before statutory offences of threatening or abusive behaviour and stalking 
were created to plug the gaps in the law which this left.21 
 
This greater interest on the part of the Scottish Parliament and Government is welcome but not 
unproblematic. The Scottish Law Commission is now significantly less well-placed to carry out 
criminal law work, having at present no Commissioner specialising in the area and having adopted 
project selection criteria which suggest precedence should be given to projects which are suitable 
for the special Parliamentary law reform procedures (which, in the Scottish Parliament, exclude 
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issues of criminal law).22 Law reform may, at best, result from work by an ad hoc independent 
review23 – perhaps lacking the resources and time normally available to the Scottish Law 
Commission – or even be a hurried responses to political pressures, such as the controversial 
Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012. 
 
As noted earlier, the picture has been somewhat different in respect of criminal procedure (and 
criminal evidence), with the Scottish Executive and Parliament having engaged actively in this area 
since devolution.24 Given the largely codified nature of Scottish criminal procedure (and partial 
codification of evidence law), such interventions did not involve any departure from existing 
patterns of law reform in the same way as amendment of the substantive criminal law. 
 
What may have changed, however, is a move from relatively managerialist changes, aimed at 
improving the efficiency with which the criminal justice system processes cases, to a willingness to 
contemplate more fundamental reform. In a process of law reform which stretches back to the 2008 
decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Salduz v Turkey,25 abolition of the corroboration 
requirement – one of the most distinctive features of the Scottish legal system – is now under 
serious consideration. The controversy to which that proposal gave rise has not removed that 
proposal from consideration, but has instead prompted further review of the Scottish jury system – 
again highly distinctive, given the use of 15-member juries, three verdicts, and the practice of 
permitting decisions to be reached by a simple majority. Controversy has been postponed for now 
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in due course to the decision in Cadder v HM Advocate 2011 S.C. (U.K.S.C.) 13 that the absence of such a right 
in Scotland was contrary to art 6 of the ECHR, and (after such a right had been created by legislation) the 
Carloway Review: Report and Recommendations (2011), which recommended inter alia that the corroboration 
requirement should be abolished. 
by the Scottish Government’s decision to put reform on hold pending a programme of research into 
the Scottish jury,26 but can be expected to resurrect itself after that work is completed. 
 
What remains relatively absent from the development of criminal law and procedure in Scotland, 
however, is pro-active rather than reactive reform. Particularly in the context of criminal law, 
reforms have largely been a response to particular court decisions or public controversies, and little 
attention has been paid to the question of ongoing improvement of the criminal law. (Legislation-
scepticism still exists, although it has perhaps shifted from an unwavering faith in the genius of the 
common law to ill-founded assertions that the Scottish Parliament for some reason cannot legislate 
well.27) The Draft Criminal Code for Scotland, which might have been hoped to be the starting point 
for a debate, has failed to gain any real traction. The Scottish Law Commission had for a time a 
commitment to reviewing the law of homicide, but this has been suspended.28 This is not the place 
for a rehearsal of the debate on codification of the criminal law,29 but it is reasonable to think that a 
mature legal system should at least have the capacity to reassess the basis on which it inflicts 
punishment on its citizens and to identify where reform is required. Developments since devolution 
provide a basis for optimism about the future improvement of the criminal law of Scotland, but 
there is still much progress to be made. 
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